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Precautions against What? The Availability Heuristic and Cross-Cultural Risk 
Perceptions 
 
Cass R. Sunstein*
 
Abstract 
 
Because risks are all on sides of social situations, it is not possible to be globally 
"precautionary." Hence the Precautionary Principle runs into serious conceptual difficulties; any 
precautions will themselves create hazards of one or another kind. When the principle gives 
guidance, it is often because of the availability heuristic, which can make some risks stand out as 
particularly salient, whatever their actual magnitude. The same heuristic helps to explain 
differences across groups, cultures, and even nations in the perception of risks, especially when 
linked with such social processes as cascades and group polarization. One difficulty here is that 
what is available is sometimes a result of predispositions, cultural and otherwise. There are 
complex links among availability, social processes for the spreading of information, and 
predispositions. 
 
 
“Many Germans believe that drinking water after eating cherries is deadly; they 
also believe that putting ice in soft drinks is unhealthy. The English, however, 
rather enjoy a cold drink of water after some cherries; and Americans love icy 
refreshments.”1
 
 “The most important factor contributing to the increased stringency of 
health, safety and environmental regulation in Europe has been a series of 
regulatory failures and crises that placed new regulatory issues on the political 
agenda and pressured policy makers to adopt more risk averse or precautionary 
policies. . . . The regulatory failure associated with BSE significantly affected the 
attitude of the European public toward GM foods. . . . Consumer and 
environmental regulations are likely to become more innovative, comprehensive 
and risk averse as a response to a widespread public perception of regulatory 
failures.”2  
 
 
It has become standard to say that with respect to risks, Europe and the United 
States can be distinguished along a single axis: Europe accepts the Precautionary 
 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, 
University of Chicago. 
1 See Joseph Henrich et al., Group Report: What is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?, in 
Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox 353-54, Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten, eds. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), for an entertaining outline in connection with food choice decisions. 
2 David Vogel, The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consumer and Environmental 
regulation in Europe, 33 B. J. Pol. S. 557, 568-69, 580 (2003). 
 
 
 
Principle, and the United States does not.3 On this view, Europeans attempt to build a 
“margin of safety” into public decisions, taking care to protect citizens against risks that 
cannot be established with certainty. By contrast, Americans are reluctant to take 
precautions, requiring clear evidence of harm in order to justify regulation. These claims 
seem plausible in light of the fact that the United States appears comparatively 
unconcerned about the risks associated with global warming and genetic modification of 
food; in those contexts, Europeans favor precautions, whereas Americans seem to require 
something akin of proof of danger. To be sure, the matter is quite different in the context 
of threats to national security. For the war in Iraq, the United States (and England) 
followed a kind of Precautionary Principle, whereas other nations (most notably France 
and Germany) wanted clearer proof of danger. But for most threats to safety and health, 
many people believe that Europe is precautionary and the United States is not. 
But as others have demonstrated,4 this opposition between Europe and America is 
false, even illusory. It is simply wrong to say that Europeans are more precautionary than 
Americans. As an empirical matter, neither is “more precautionary.” Europeans are not 
more averse to risks than Americans. They are more averse to particular risks,5 such as 
the risks associated with global warming; but Americans have their own preoccupations 
as well. My larger point, a central claim of this chapter, is conceptual. No nation can, 
even in principle, commit itself to precaution as such.6 The real problem with the 
Precautionary Principle, at least in its strongest forms, is that it is incoherent; it purports 
to give guidance, but it fails to do so, because it condemns the very steps that it requires. 
Was the war in Iraq precautionary? Is it precautionary to ban cellular telephones, nuclear 
power plants, genetically modified food, and airplanes? These questions should be 
enough to suggest that precautions always give rise to risks of their own—and that the 
                                                 
3 On some of the complexities here, see John S. Applegate, The Precautionary Preference: An American 
Perspective on the Precautionary Principle, 6 Hum. & Ecol. Risk Assess. 413 (2000); Peter H. Sand, The 
Precautionary Principle: A European Perspective, 6 Hum. & Ecol. Risk Assess. 445 (2000). 
4 See the illuminating discussions in Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution, Risk, and Multiplicity (unpublished 
manuscript 2004); Jonathan B. Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the United States 
and Europe, 5 J Risk Research 317 (2002). 
5 See Vogel, supra note, for many examples in the context of health, safety, and the environment. 
6 I draw here from Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming 2005) and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1003 (2003). 
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operation of the Precautionary Principle is inextricably intertwined with social risk 
perceptions. 
Nations can regard themselves as “precautionary” only if they blind ourselves to 
many aspects of risk-related situations and focus on a narrow subset of what is at stake. 
That kind of self-blinding is what makes the Precautionary Principle seem to give 
guidance; and I shall have a fair bit to say about why people and societies are selective in 
their fears. My major hypothesis is that the availability heuristic is often the source of 
people’s fears about certain risks.7 If a particular incident is cognitively “available”—
both vivid and salient—then people will have a heightened fear of the risk in question. If 
people in one nation fear the risks associated with terrorism, and people in another nation 
fear the risks associated with mad cow disease, the availability heuristic is likely to be the 
reason. Hence cultural differences, with respect to application of the precautionary 
principle, are often rooted in availability. But this point misses some complexities, about 
both social influences and cultural predispositions; I shall turn to these in due course. The 
availability heuristic does not operate in a social or cultural vacuum. 
In short, I aim here both to show that the Precautionary Principle is not quite what 
it seems and that its operation is underwritten by an identifiable heuristic with social and 
cultural foundations. The result is a hypothesis, to the effect that cross-cultural 
differences in both risk perception and in precautions are produced, in large part, by 
availability. I shall not be able to prove that hypothesis in this space, but I hope to be able 
to say enough to prove that the hypothesis is plausible, illuminating, and worth further 
exploration.  
Weak and Strong 
 
Begin with the Precautionary Principle.8 There are twenty or more definitions, 
and they are not compatible with one another.9 We can imagine a continuum of 
                                                 
7 Undoubtedly a great deal can be learned from use of the psychometric paradigm, stressed in Bernd 
Rorhmann and Ortwin Renn, Risk Perception Research: An Introduction, in Cross-Cultural Risk 
Perception: A Survey of Empirical Studies 11, 17-18 (Ortwin Renn and Bernd Rorhmann eds. 2000). I 
stress the availability heuristic here because of its comparative simplicity, but the heuristic interacts in 
complex ways with psychometrics and with culture; I try at least to scratch some of the surfaces here. 
8 This and the following sections draw extensively from Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 
supra note. 
9 See Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary 
Principle, supra note 13, at 1-19; Wiener, supra note. 
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understandings. At one extreme are weak versions to which no reasonable person could 
object. At the other extreme are strong versions that would require a fundamental 
rethinking of regulatory policy.  
The most cautious and weak versions suggest, quite sensibly, that a lack of 
decisive evidence of harm should not be a ground for refusing to regulate. Controls might 
be justified even if we cannot establish a definite connection between, for example, low-
level exposures to certain carcinogens and adverse effects on human health. Thus the 
1992 Rio Declaration states, “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.”10 The Ministerial Declaration of the 
Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, held in London in 
1987, is in the same vein: “Accepting that in order to protect the North Sea from possibly 
damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, a Precautionary Principle is 
necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a 
causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence.”11 Similarly, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change offers cautious language: 
“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing [regulatory] measures, taking into account 
that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to 
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”12  
The widely publicized Wingspread Declaration, from a meeting of 
environmentalists in 1998, goes somewhat further: “When an activity raises threats of 
harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even 
if some cause and effect relationships are not established scientifically. In this context the 
proponent of the activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof.”13 The 
first sentence just quoted is more aggressive than the Rio Declaration because it is not 
limited to threats of serious or irreversible damage. And in reversing the burden of proof, 
                                                 
10 Quoted in Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist 347 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
11 Quoted in Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle 3, Julian Morris, ed. (Oxford: Butterworth-
Heinemann, 2000). 
12 See Indur Goklany, The Precautionary Principle 6 (2001). 
13 Id. A strong version is defended in Carolyn Raffensperger & Peter L. deFur, Implementing the 
Precautionary Principle: Rigorous Science and Solid Ethics, 5 Hum. & Ecol. Risk Assess. 933, 934 (1999). 
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the second sentence goes further still. Of course everything depends on what those with 
the burden of proof must show in particular.  
In Europe, the Precautionary Principle is sometimes understood in a still stronger 
way, suggesting that it is important to build “a margin of safety into all decision 
making.”14 According to one definition, the Precautionary Principle means “that action 
should be taken to correct a problem as soon as there is evidence that harm may occur, 
not after the harm has already occurred.”15 The word “may” is the crucial one here. In a 
comparably strong version, it is said that “the Precautionary Principle mandates that 
when there is a risk of significant health or environmental damage to others or to future 
generations, and when there is scientific uncertainty as to the nature of that damage or the 
likelihood of the risk, then decisions should be made so as to prevent such activities from 
being conducted unless and until scientific evidence shows that the damage will not 
occur.”16 The words “will not occur” seem to require proponents of an activity to 
demonstrate that there is no risk at all—often an impossible burden to meet. The 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted in 
2000, appears to adopt a strong version as well.17 The Final Declaration of the First 
European “Seas At Risk” conference says that if “the ‘worst case scenario’ for a certain 
activity is serious enough then even a small amount of doubt as to the safety of that 
activity is sufficient to stop it taking place.”18  
 
Safe and Sorry? 
 
The weak versions of the Precautionary Principle are unobjectionable and 
important. Every day, individuals and nations take steps to avoid hazards that are far from 
certain. We do not walk in moderately dangerous areas at night; we exercise; we buy 
smoke detectors; we buckle our seatbelts; we might even avoid fatty foods (or 
carbohydrates). Sensible governments regulate risks that, in individual cases or even in 
the aggregate, have a well under 100% chance of coming to fruition. An individual might 
                                                 
14 See Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist 348 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
15 http://www.logophilia.com/WordSpy/precautionaryprinciple.asp 
16 Testimony of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth, before the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, (Jan. 24, 2002). 
17 See Goklany, supra note, at 6. 
18 Final Declaration of the First European “Seas At Risk” Conference, Annex 1, Copenhagen, 1994. 
5 
 
 
ignore a mortality risk of 1/500,000, because that risk is quite small, but if 100 million 
citizens face that risk, the nation had better take it seriously. With respect to the weak 
version of the Precautionary Principle, there are significant cross-cultural variations; but 
no serious person rejects that version. 
For the moment let us understand the principle in a strong way, to suggest that 
regulation is required whenever there is a possible risk to health, safety, or the 
environment, even if the supporting evidence remains speculative and even if the 
economic costs of regulation are high. To avoid absurdity, the idea of “possible risk” will 
be understood to require a certain threshold of scientific plausibility. To support 
regulation, no one thinks that it is enough if someone, somewhere, urges that a risk is 
worth taking seriously. But under the Precautionary Principle as I shall understand it, the 
threshold burden is minimal, and once it is met, there is something like a presumption in 
favor of regulatory controls. This version, as we shall see, helps to clarify a significant 
problem with the idea of precaution, and also to illuminate the existence of cross-national 
differences. 
Why the Precautionary Principle Is Paralyzing 
 
Why might the Precautionary Principle, understood in its strong sense, have such 
widespread appeal? At first glance, the answer is simple, for the principle contains some 
important truth. Certainly we should acknowledge that a small probability (say, 1 in 
25,000) of a serious harm (say, 1,000,000 deaths) deserves extremely serious attention. It 
is worthwhile to spend a lot of money to eliminate that risk. An economically oriented 
critic might observe that our resources are limited and that if we spend large amounts of 
resources on highly speculative harms, we will not be allocating those resources wisely. 
In fact this is the simplest criticism of the Precautionary Principle.19 If we take costly 
steps to address all risks, however improbable they are, we will quickly impoverish 
ourselves. On this view, the Precautionary Principle “would make for a dim future.”20 It 
would also eliminate technologies and strategies that make human lives easier, more 
convenient, healthier, and longer.  
                                                 
19 See John D. Graham, Decision-Analytic Refinements of the Precautionary Principle, 4 J. Risk Research 
127 (2001). 
20 See Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary 
Principle, supra note, at 1, 17. 
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But there is something both odd and revealing about these claims. The 
Precautionary Principle is designed to decrease morbidity and mortality; how could it 
possibly make the future “dim”? I suggest that the real problem with the principle is that 
it offers no guidance—not that it is wrong, but that it forbids all courses of action, 
including regulation. Taken seriously, it bans the very steps that it requires. To 
understand the difficulty, it will be useful to anchor the discussion in some concrete 
problems: 
 
1. Genetic modification of food has become a widespread practice.21 The risks of that 
practice are not known with any precision. Some people fear that genetic 
modification will result in serious ecological harm and large risks to human health; 
others believe that genetic modification will result in more nutritious food and 
significant improvements in human health. 
2. Scientists are not in accord about the dangers associated with global warming,22 
but there is general agreement that global warming is in fact occurring. It is 
possible that global warming will produce, by 2100, a mean temperature increase 
of 4.5 degrees C (the high-end estimate of the International Panel on Climate 
Change); that it will result in $5 trillion or more in monetized costs; and that it will 
also produce a significant number of deaths from malaria. The Kyoto Protocol 
would require most industrialized nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 
92%-94% of 1990 levels. A great deal of work suggests that significant decreases 
in such emissions would have large benefits; but skeptics contend that the costs of 
such decreases would reduce the well-being of millions of people, especially the 
poorest members of society. 
3. Many people fear nuclear power, on the ground that nuclear power plants create 
various health and safety risks, including some possibility of catastrophe. But if a 
nation does not rely on nuclear power, it might well rely instead on fossil fuels, 
and in particular on coal-fired power plants. Such plants create risks of their own, 
                                                 
21 Alan McHughen, Pandora’s Picnic Basket (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
22 For discussion, see Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004); Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001); William D. Nordhaus & Joseph Boyer, Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming 
168 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000). 
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including risks associated with global warming. China, for example, has relied on 
nuclear energy, in a way that reduces greenhouse gases and a range of air pollution 
problems.23 
4. In the first years of the twenty-first century, one of the most controversial 
environmental issues in the United States involved the regulation of arsenic in 
drinking water. There is a serious dispute over the precise level of risks posed by 
low levels of arsenic in water, but on the “worst case” scenario, over one hundred 
lives might be lost each year as a result of the 50 part per billion standard that the 
Clinton Administration sought to revise. At the same time, the proposed 10 part 
per billion standard would cost over $200 million each year, and it is possible that 
it would save as few as six lives annually. 
 
In these cases, what kind of guidance is provided by the Precautionary Principle? 
It is tempting to say, as is in fact standard, that the principle calls for strong controls on 
genetic engineering of food, on greenhouse gases, on arsenic, and on nuclear power. In 
all of these cases, there is a possibility of serious harms, and no authoritative scientific 
evidence demonstrates that the possibility is close to zero. If the burden of proof is on the 
proponent of the activity or processes in question, the Precautionary Principle would 
seem to impose a burden of proof that cannot be met. Put to one side the question 
whether the Precautionary Principle, understood to compel stringent regulation in these 
cases, is sensible. Let us ask a more fundamental question: Is that more stringent 
regulation therefore compelled by the Precautionary Principle? 
The answer is that it is not. In some of these cases, it should be easy to see that in 
its own way, stringent regulation would actually run afoul of the Precautionary Principle. 
The simplest reason is that such regulation might well deprive society of significant 
benefits, and hence produce serious harms that would otherwise not occur. In some cases, 
                                                 
23 See Ling Zhong, Note: Nuclear Energy: China's Approach Towards Addressing Global Warming, 12 
Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 493 (2000). Of course it is possible to urge that nations should reduce reliance on 
either coal-fired power plants or nuclear power, and move instead toward environmentally preferred 
alternatives, such as solar power. For general discussion, see Renewable Energy: Power for a Sustainable 
Future, Godfrey Boyle, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press in association with the Open University, 
1996); Allan Collinson, Renewable Energy (Austin, Tex.: Steck-Vaughn Library, 1991); Dan E. Arvizu, 
Advanced Energy Technology and Climate Change Policy Implications, 2 Fl. Coastal L.J. 435 (2001). But 
these alternatives pose problems of their own, involving feasibility and expense. See Lomborg, supra note, 
at 118-48. 
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regulation eliminates the “opportunity benefits” of a process or activity, and thus causes 
preventable deaths. If this is so, regulation is hardly precautionary. Consider the “drug 
lag,” produced whenever the government takes a highly precautionary approach to the 
introduction of new medicines and drugs onto the market. If a government insists on such 
an approach, it will protect people against harms from inadequately tested drugs; but it 
will also prevent people from receiving potential benefits from those very drugs. Is it 
“precautionary” to require extensive premarketing testing, or to do the opposite?  
In the context of medicines to prevent AIDS, those who favor “precautions” have 
asked governments to reduce the level of premarketing testing, precisely in the interest of 
health. The United States, by the way, is more precautionary about new medicines than 
are most European nations. But by failing to allow such medicines on the market, the 
United States fails to take precautions against the illnesses that could be reduced by 
speedier procedures. 
Or consider the continuing debate over whether certain antidepressants impose a 
(small) risk of breast cancer.24 A precautionary approach might seem to caution against 
use of such antidepressants because of their carcinogenic potential. But the failure to use 
those depressants might well impose risks of its own, certainly psychological and 
possibly even physical (because psychological ailments are sometimes associated with 
physical ones as well). Or consider the decision, by the Soviet Union, to evacuate and 
relocate more than 270,000 people in response to the risk of adverse effects from the 
Chernobyl fallout. It is not clear that on balance, this massive relocation project was 
justified on health grounds: “A comparison ought to have been made between the 
psychological and medical burdens of this measure (anxiety, psychosomatic diseases, 
depression and suicides) and the harm that may have been prevented.”25 More generally, 
a sensible government might want to ignore the small risks associated with low levels of 
                                                 
24 See Judith P. Kelly et al., Risk of Breast Cancer According to Use of Antidepressants, Phenothiazines, 
and Antihistamines, 150 Am. J. Epidemiology 861 (1999); C.R. Sharpe et al., The Effects of Tricyclic 
Antidepressants on Breast Cancer Risk, 86 Brit. J. of Cancer 92 (2002). 
25 Maurice Tubiana, Radiation Risks in Perspective: Radiation-Induced Cancer Among Cancer Risks, 39(1) 
Radiat. Environ. Biophy. 3, 8-10 (2000). 
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radiation, on the ground that precautionary responses are likely to cause fear that 
outweighs any health benefits from those responses.26
Or consider a more general question about how to handle low-level toxic agents, 
including carcinogens. Do such agents cause adverse effects? If we lack clear evidence, it 
might seem “precautionary” to assume that they do, and hence to assume, in the face of 
uncertainty, that the dose-response curve is linear and without safe thresholds.27 In the 
United States, this is the default assumption of the Environmental Protection Agency. But 
is this approach unambiguously precautionary? Considerable evidence suggests that 
many toxic agents that are harmful at high levels are actually beneficial at low levels.28 
Thus “hormesis” is a dose-response relationship in which low doses stimulate desirable 
effects and high doses inhibit them. When hormesis is involved, government use of a 
linear dose-response curve, assuming no safe thresholds, will actually cause mortality and 
morbidity effects. Which default approach to the dose-response curve is precautionary? 
To raise this question is not to take any stand on whether some, many, or all toxic agents 
are beneficial or instead harmful at very low doses. It is only to say that the simultaneous 
possibility of benefits at low levels and of harms at low levels makes the Precautionary 
Principle paralyzing. The principle requires use of a linear, non-threshold model; but it 
simultaneously condemns use of that very model. For this and other reasons, unreflective 
use of the Precautionary Principle, it has been argued, threatens to increase rather than 
decrease the risks associated with food.29
Or consider the case of genetic modification of food. Many people believe that a 
failure to allow genetic modification might well result in numerous deaths, and a small 
probability of many more. The reason is that genetic modification holds out the promise 
of producing food that is both cheaper and healthier—resulting, for example, in “golden 
                                                 
26 Id. For some counterevidence in an important context, see Lennart Hardell et al., Further Aspects on 
Cellular and Cordless Telephones and Brain Tumours, 22 Intl. J. Oncology 399 (2003) (discussing 
evidence of an association between cellular telephones and cancer). 
27 For criticism of the linearity assumption, see Maurice Tubiana, Radiation Risks in Perspective: 
Radiation-Induced Cancer Among Cancer Risks, 39(1) Radiat. Environ. Biophy. 3, 8-9 (2000). 
28 See Edward J. Calabrese and Linda A. Baldwin, Hormesis: The Dose Response Revolution, 43 Annu. 
Rev. Pharmacol. Toxicol. 175 (2003); Edward J. Calabrese and Linda A. Baldwin, The Hormetic Dose-
Response Model Is More Common Than the Threshold Model in Toxicology, 71 Toxcol. Sciences 246 
(2003). 
29 J.C. Hanekamp et al., Chloramphenicol, Food Safety, and Precautionary Thinking in Europe, 6 Env. 
Liability 209 (2003). 
10 
 
 
rice,” which might have large benefits in developing countries. My point is not that 
genetic modification will likely have those benefits, or that the benefits of genetic 
modification outweigh the risks. The claim is only that if the Precautionary Principle is 
taken literally, it is offended by regulation as well as by nonregulation.  
The example suggests that regulation sometimes violates the Precautionary 
Principle because it gives rise to substitute risks, in the form of hazards that materialize, 
or are increased, as a result of regulation.30 Consider the case of DDT, often banned or 
regulated in the interest of reducing risks to birds and human beings. The problem with 
such bans is that in poor nations, they eliminate what appears to be the most effective 
way of combating malaria—and thus significantly undermine public health.31 Or consider 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s effort to ban asbestos,32 a ban that 
might well seem justified or even compelled by the Precautionary Principle. The 
difficulty, from the standpoint of that very principle, is that substitutes for asbestos also 
carry risks. The problem is pervasive. In the case of arsenic, the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency expressed concern that aggressive regulation, by virtue 
of its cost, will lead people to cease using local water systems and to rely on private 
wells, which have high levels of contamination.33 If this is so, stringent arsenic regulation 
violates the Precautionary Principle no less than less stringent regulation does. This is a 
common situation, for opportunity benefits and substitute risks are the rule, not the 
exception.34  
                                                 
30 See the discussion of risk-related tradeoffs in John Graham & Jonathan Wiener, Risk vs. Risk 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, in Cass 
R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason, 133-52 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
31 See Goklany, supra note, at 13-27. 
32 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir., 1991). 
33 “But we have seen instances, particularly in the West and Midwest, where arsenic is naturally occurring 
at up to 700 and more parts per billion, where the cost of remediation has forced water companies to close, 
leaving people with no way to get their water, save dig wells. And then they are getting water that’s even 
worse than what they were getting through the water company.” Christine Todd Whitman, Administrator, 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, in interview by Robert Novak & Al Hunt, CNN Evans, Novak, 
Hunt & Shields, Cable News Network, (April 21, 2001). 
34 Note also that some regulation will have ancillary benefits, by reducing risks other than those that are 
specifically targeted. For a valuable discussion, see Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of 
Risk Tradeoff Analysis, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1763 (2002). 
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It is possible to go much further. A great deal of evidence suggests the possibility 
that an expensive regulation can have adverse effects on life and health. 35 It has been 
urged that a statistical life can be lost for every expenditure of $7 million36; one study 
suggests that an expenditure of $15 million produces a loss of life.37 Another suggests 
that poor people are especially vulnerable to this effect—that a regulation that reduces 
wealth for the poorest 20% of the population will have twice as large a mortality effect as 
a regulation that reduces wealth for the wealthiest 20%.38 To be sure, both the 
phenomenon and the underlying mechanisms are disputed.39 I do not mean to accept any 
particular amount here, or even to suggest that there has been an unambiguous 
demonstration of an association between mortality and regulatory expenditures. The only 
point is that reasonable people believe in that association. It follow that a multimillion 
dollar expenditure for “precaution” has—as a worst case scenario—significant adverse 
health effects, with an expenditure of $200 million as leading to perhaps as many as 
twenty to thirty lives lost.  
This point makes the Precautionary Principle hard to implement not merely where 
regulation removes “opportunity benefits,” or introduces or increases substitute risks, but 
in any case in which the regulation costs a significant amount. If this is so, the 
Precautionary Principle, for that very reason, raises doubts about many regulations. If the 
principle argues against any action that carries a small risk of imposing significant harm, 
then we should be reluctant to spend a lot of money to reduce risks, simply because those 
expenditures themselves carry risks. Here is the sense in which, the Precautionary 
Principle, taken for all that it is worth, is paralyzing: It stands as an obstacle to regulation 
and nonregulation, and to everything in between.40  
                                                 
35Ralph Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 Risk Anal. 147 (1990); Randall 
Lutter & John F. Morrall, III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety 
Regulation, 8(1) J. Risk & Uncertainty 43, 49 table 1 (1994).  
36 See Keeney, supra note 72. 
37 See Robert W. Hahn et al., Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality? (Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute, 2000). 
38 See Kenneth S. Chapman & Govind Hariharan, Do Poor People Have a Stronger Relationship Between 
Income and Mortality Than the Rich? Implications of Panel Data for Health-Health Analysis, 12 J. Risk & 
Uncertainty 51, 58-63 (1996). 
39See Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall, III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and 
Safety Regulation, 8 J. Risk & Uncertainty 43, 49 table 1 (1994). 
40 It is possible, however, to understand the Precautionary Principle in a narrower way, one that focuses on 
catastrophic risks under conditions of uncertainty; on irreversible harm; and on margins of safety for 
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It should now be easier to understand my earlier suggestion that despite its formal 
enthusiasm for the Precautionary Principle, European nations are not “more 
precautionary” than the United States. Simply as a logical matter, societies, like 
individuals, cannot be highly precautionary with respect to all risks. Each society and 
each person must select certain risks for special attention. In these respects, the selectivity 
of precautions is not merely an empirical fact; it is a conceptual inevitability. Comparing 
Europe to the United States, Jonathan Wiener and Michael Rogers have demonstrated 
this point empirically.41 In the early twenty-first century, for example, the United States 
appears to take a highly precautionary approach to the risks associated with abandoned 
hazardous waste dumps and terrorism, but not to take a highly precautionary approach to 
the risks associated with global warming, indoor air pollution, poverty, poor diet, and 
obesity. It would be most valuable to attempt to see which nations are especially 
precautionary with respect to which risks, and also to explore changes over time. 
 A nation-by-nation study commissioned by the German Federal Environmental 
Agency goes so far as to conclude that there are two separate camps in the industrialized 
world: “precaution countries” (Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United 
States) and “protection countries” (Japan, France, and the United Kingdom).42 But this 
conclusion seems to me ludicrously implausible. The universe of risks is far too large to 
permit categorizations of this kind. The most general point is that no nation is 
precautionary in general and costly precautions are inevitably taken against only those 
hazards that seem especially salient or insistent.43 The problem with the Precautionary 
Principle is that it wrongly suggests that nations can and should adopt a general form of 
risk aversion. 
The Availability Heuristic 
 
I suggest that the Precautionary Principle becomes operational if and only if those 
who apply it wear blinders—only, that is, if they focus on some aspects of the regulatory 
situation but downplay or disregard others. But this suggestion simply raises an 
                                                                                                                                                 
particular kinds of risk. I do not explore these narrower versions here. For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2005). 
41 See Wiener and Rogers, supra note.  
42 See Sand, supra note, at 448. 
43 See Vogel, supra note, at 570-71, for a demonstration of this point for Europe. 
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additional question: What accounts for the particular blinders that underlie applications of 
the Precautionary Principle? What people’s attention is selective, why is it selective in the 
way that it is? What might different nations, with quite different policies, all believe that 
they are being precautionary? Much of the answer, I contend, lies in an understanding of 
behavioral economics and cognitive psychology, which provide important clues to cross-
cultural differences in risk perception. The availability heuristic is the place to start. 
It is well-established that in thinking about risks, people rely on certain heuristics, 
or rules of thumb, which serve to simplify their inquiry.44 Heuristics typically work 
through a process of “attribute substitution,” in which people answer a hard question by 
substituting an easier one.45 Should we be fearful of nuclear power, terrorism, abduction 
of young children, mad cow disease, contaminated blood, or pesticides? When people use 
the availability heuristic, they assess the magnitude of risks by asking whether examples 
can readily come to mind.46 If people can easily think of such examples, they are far more 
likely to be frightened than if they cannot. The availability heuristic illuminates the 
operation of the Precautionary Principle, by showing why some hazards will be on-screen 
and why others will be neglected. The availability heuristic also tells us a great deal about 
differences in risk perceptions across groups, cultures, and even nations. 
For example, “a class whose instances are easily retrieved will appear more 
numerous than a class of equal frequency whose instances are less retrievable.”47 
Consider a simple study showing people a list of well-known people of both sexes, and 
asking them whether the list contains more names of women or more names of men. In 
lists in which the men were especially famous, people thought that they were more names 
of men, whereas in lists in which the women were the more famous, people thought that 
there were more names of women.48
                                                 
44 See Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982). 
45 See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in 
Intuitive Judgment 49, 53 in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, Thomas 
Gilovich, Dale Griffin, & Daniel Kahneman, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002). 
46 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in id. at 3, 
11-14. 
47 Id. at 11. 
48 Id. 
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This is a point about how familiarity can affect the availability of instances. A risk 
that is familiar, like that associated with terrorism, will be seen as more serious than a 
risk that is less familiar, like that associated with sun-bathing. But salience is important as 
well. “For example, the impact of seeing a house burning on the subjective probability of 
such accidents is probably greater than the impact of reading about a fire in the local 
paper.”49 So too, recent events will have a greater impact than earlier ones. The point 
helps explain differences across time and space in much risk-related behavior, including 
decisions to take precautions. Whether people will buy insurance for natural disasters is 
greatly affected by recent experiences.50 If floods have not occurred in the immediate 
past, people who live on flood plains are far less likely to purchase insurance. In the 
aftermath of an earthquake, insurance for earthquakes rises sharply—but it declines 
steadily from that point, as vivid memories recede. Note that the use of the availability 
heuristic, in these contexts, is hardly irrational.51 Both insurance and precautionary 
measures can be expensive, and what has happened before seems, much of the time, to be 
the best available guide to what will happen again. The problem is that the availability 
heuristic can lead to serious errors, in terms of both excessive fear and neglect. 
What, in particular, produces availability? An intriguing essay attempts to test the 
effects of ease of imagery on perceived judgments of risk.52 The study asked subjects to 
read about an illness (Hyposcenia-B) that “was becoming increasingly prevalent” on the 
local campus. In one condition, the symptoms were concrete and easy to imagine—
involving muscle aches, low energy, and frequent severe headaches. In another condition, 
the symptoms were vague and hard to imagine, involving an inflamed liver, a 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 40 (London; Sterling, Va.: Earthscan Publications, 2000). 
51 Kahneman and Tversky emphasize that the heuristics they identify “are highly economical and usually 
effective,” but also that they “lead to systematic and predictable errors.” See Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in Judgment and Decision Making: An 
Interdisciplinary Reader 38, 55, Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond, eds. (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986). Gerd Gigenzer, among others, has emphasized that some heuristics can 
work extremely well, see Gerd Gigerenzer et al., Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart (New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1999); Gerd Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World (New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000), and used this point as a rejoinder to those who stress the errors 
introduced by heuristics and biases. I do not mean to take a stand on the resulting debates. Even if many 
heuristics mostly work well in daily life, a sensible government can do much better than to rely on them.  
52 In Steven J. Sherman et al., Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likelihood of Contracting a 
Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imagery, in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive 
Judgment 82, Thomas Gilovich et al., eds. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002). 
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malfunctioning nervous system, and a general sense of disorientation. Subjects in both 
conditions were asked to imagine a three-week period in which they had the disease and 
to write a detailed description of what they imagined. After doing so, subjects were asked 
to assess, on a ten-point scale, their likelihood of contracting the disease. The basic 
finding was that likelihood judgments were very different in the two conditions, with 
easily-imagined symptoms making people far more inclined to believe that they were 
likely to get the disease.  
The availability heuristic helps to explains the operation of the Precautionary 
Principle and cross-national differences for a simple reason: Sometimes a certain risk, 
said to call for precautions, is cognitively available, whereas other risks, including those 
associated with regulation itself, are not. In many cases where the Precautionary Principle 
seems to offer guidance, the reason is that some of the relevant risks are available while 
others are barely visible. And if one nation is concerned with the risk of sunbathing and 
another is not, availability is likely to provide a large part of the reason. This, then, is my 
central hypothesis: Differences across nations, in the perception of risks, have a great 
deal to do with the operation of the availability heuristic.  
To be sure, those differences are also motivated in large part by actual differences 
in risk levels. Fortunately, reality matters. Nations suffering from high levels of malaria 
are likely to perceive malaria risks as far greater than nations in which malaria is not a 
problem. Countries that face serious risks from contaminated blood will probably show 
greater fear of contaminated blood than countries in which contaminated blood is not a 
problem. But availability produces differences in perceptions that do not track differences 
in reality. 
The study of cross-cultural risk perceptions remains in its infancy,53 and hence my 
claim must remain only a hypothesis, one that I cannot establish to be true. What is 
necessary, and what is lacking, is anything like comprehensive information about cross-
cultural risk perceptions, allowing us to test the role of availability. And we shall shortly 
see some complexities that bear on the adequacy of the availability hypothesis. But for 
now, consider some supportive evidence: 
                                                 
53 See Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of Empirical Studies (Ortwin Renn and Bernd Rorhmann 
eds. 2000). 
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1. Within the United States, public concern about risks usually does track changes in 
the actual fluctuations in those risks. But public concern outruns actual 
fluctuations in the important case of “panics,” bred by vivid illustrations that do 
not reflect changes in levels of danger.54 At certain points in the 1970s and 1980s, 
there were extreme leaps in concern about teenage suicides, herpes, illegitimacy, 
and AIDS—leaps that did not correspond to changes in the size of the problem. 
Availability, produced by “a particularly vivid case or new finding that receives 
considerable media attention,” played a major role in those leaps in public 
concern.55 Sometimes the concern led to unjustified precautions, as in the 
behavior of some parents who refused to allow their children to attend classes 
having students with signs of herpes. 
2. Availability helps to explain the findings of a cross-national study of perceptions 
of risk associated with terrorism and SARS.56 In that study, Americans perceived 
terrorism to be a far greater threat, to themselves and to others, than SARS; 
Canadians perceived SARS to be a greater threat, to themselves and to others, 
than terrorism. Americans estimated their chance of serious harm from terrorism 
as 8.27%, about four times as high as their estimate of their chance of serious 
harm from SARS (2.18%). Canadians estimated their chance of serious harm 
from SARS as 7.43%, significantly higher than their estimate for terrorism 
(6.04%). Notably, the figures for SARS were unrealistically high, especially for 
Canadians; the best estimate of the risk of contracting SARS, based on Canadian 
figures, was .0008% (and the chance of dying as a result less than .0002%). For 
obvious reasons, the objective risks from terrorism are much harder to calculate, 
but if it is estimated that the United States will suffer at least one terrorist attack 
each year with the same number of deaths as on September 11, the risk of death 
from terrorism is about .001%—a speculative number under the circumstances, 
but not an implausible place to start. 
                                                 
54 See George Loewenstein and Jane Mather, Dynamic Processes in Risk Perception, 3 J. Risk and 
Uncertainty 155 (1990). 
55 Id. at 172. 
56 See Neal Feigenson et al., Perceptions of Terrorism and Disease Risks: A Cross-National Comparison, 
U. Cin. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2005). 
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The availability heuristic helps to account for these cross-national differences 
and for the generally exaggerated risk perceptions. In the United States, risks of 
terrorism have (to say the least) received a great deal of attention, producing a 
continuing sense of threat. But there have been no incidents of SARS, and the 
media coverage has been limited to events elsewhere—producing a degree of 
salience, but far lower than that associated with terrorism. In Canada, the opposite 
is the case. The high degree of public discussion of SARS cases, accompanied by 
readily available instances, produced an inflated sense of the numbers—
sufficiently inflated to exceed the same numbers from terrorism (certainly a 
salient risk in Canada, as in most nations post 9/11).  
3. What accounts for people’s perception of their risk of being infected with HIV? 
Why are some people and some groups largely unconcerned about that risk, while 
other people and groups are highly focused on with it? A study of rural Kenya and 
Malawi suggests that availability plays a critical role.57 The authors find that risk 
perception is a product of discussions that “are often provoked by observing or 
hearing about an illness or death.”58 People “know in the abstract how HIV is 
transmitted and how it can be prevented,” but they are unclear “about the 
advisability and effectiveness of the changes in sexual behavior that are 
recommended by experts.59 Perceptions of the risk of HIV transition are very 
much a function of social networks, with pronounced changes in belief and 
behavior resulting from interactions with other people expressing a high level of 
concern. The effects of social networks are thus asymmetric, with substantial 
effects from having “at least one network partner who is perceived to have a great 
deal of concern about AIDS.” The authors do not refer explicitly to the 
availability heuristic, but their findings are compatible with the suggestion that 
with respect to AIDS, risk perceptions are produced by availability. 
                                                 
57 See Jere R. Behrman et al., Social Networks, HIV/AIDS, and Risk Perceptions (Feb, 18, 2003), available 
at ssrn.com. 
58 Id. at 10. 
59 Id. at 18. 
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4. A study of Bulgaria and Romania concludes that differences in levels of perceived 
risk “cannot be explained by differences in levels of real risk.”60 Indeed, the 
content of media are “a more potent determinant of perceived risk than real 
risk.”61 Cultural variables were not found to be crucial. In general, “perceived risk 
is a function of real risk and perhaps media risk rather than culturally contingent 
values and belief.”62 
5. There are many commonalities between the risk perceptions of Americans and 
those of citizens of France.63 But such differences as there are have a great deal to 
do with availability. Hence there is far more concern in France with genetically 
engineered bacteria, a risk with a high degree of publicity.64 By contrast, 
Americans show far more concern in the United States with coal-fired power 
plants, with radon in home, and with sun-tanning—three much-publicized sources 
of risk.65  
6. What accounts for the recent rise of precautionary thinking in Europe? Why have 
certain environmental and health risk achieved so much salience in England, 
France, and the European Union generally? A comprehensive study suggests that 
a few readily available incidents played a large role.66 In the 1990s, a “wave of 
crises” involving food safety, above all mad cow disease, led to the deaths of 
about one hundred people, with especially large effects on public attitudes.67 In a 
tribute to the operation of availability, the “regulatory failure associated with BSE 
significantly affected the attitude of the European public toward GM foods.”68 An 
additional “scandal was the apparent failure of French government officials and 
doctors to protect haemopholiacs from blood contaminated with AIDS” virus, in a 
way that had large repercussions for public opinion in France.69 The conclusion is 
                                                 
60 See Lennart Sjoberg et al., Risk Perception in Bulgaria and Romania, in id. at 147.  
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 178. 
63 Paul Slovic et al., Nuclear Power and the Public: A Comparative Study of Risk Perception in France and 
the United States, in Cross-Cultural Risk Perception 55 (Ortwin Renn and Bernd Rohrmann eds. 2000). 
64 Id. at 74. 
65 Id. 
66 See Vogel, supra note. 
67 Id. at 568-69. 
68 ID. at 569.  
69 Id. at 570-71.  
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that differences between European and American policies are not a product of 
deep-rooted cultural differences, but instead have a great deal to do with 
“widespread public perception of regulatory failures,” often based on particular, 
vivid, and widely salient events.70 
 
Social Influences 
 
Thus far my emphasis has been on individual cognition. But to say the least, the 
availability heuristic does not operate in a social vacuum. What is readily “available” to 
some individuals, groups, cultures, and nations will not be available to all. Within the 
United States, many of those who favor gun control legislation have “available” a set of 
incidents in which such legislation would have avoided unnecessary deaths; many of 
those who reject such legislation are alert to incidents in which private gun ownership 
allowed people to fend off criminal violence.71 Obviously both government and the 
media make some risks appear particularly salient. Consider President George W. Bush’s 
plea: “Imagine those 19 hijackers [involved in the 9/11 attacks] with other weapons and 
plans, this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate 
slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known.” 
Environmentalists, in and out of government, operate in the same way, focusing public 
attention on potentially catastrophic harms. Well-organized private groups play a central 
role in activating public concern.  
The question suggests the need to attend to the social and cultural dimensions of 
fear and risk perception. In many cases of high-visibility, low-probability dangers, such 
as sniper attacks, shark attacks, contaminated blood, and the kidnapping of young girls, 
the sources of availability are not obscure. The mass media focus on those risks; people 
communicate their fear and concern to one another; the widespread fact of fear and 
concern increases media attention; and the spiral continues until people move on. Hence 
the “risk of the month” syndrome, familiar in many societies, stems from the interaction 
between availability and social influences. Much of the time, however, what is available 
and salient to some is not available and salient to all. For example, many of those who 
                                                 
70 Id. at 580. 
71 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk 
Perceptions, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1291 (2003). 
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endorse the Precautionary Principle focus on cases in which the government failed to 
regulate some environmental harm, demanding irrefutable proof, with the consequence 
being widespread illness and death. To such people, the available incidents require strong 
precautions in the face of uncertainty. But many other people, skeptical of the 
Precautionary Principle, focus on cases in which the government overreacted to weak 
science, causing large expenditures for little gain in terms of health or safety. To such 
people, the available incidents justify a measure of restraint in the face of uncertainty. 
Which cases will be available and to whom?  
In any case people and cultures have different predispositions. These 
predispositions play a large role in determining which, of the numerous possibilities, is 
salient. If you are predisposed to be fearful of genetic modification of food, you are more 
likely to seek out, and to recall, incidents in which genetic modification was said to cause 
harm. If you are predisposed to fear electromagnetic fields, you will pay attention to 
apparent incidents in which electromagnetic fields have produced an elevated incidence 
of cancer. If you are predisposed to believe that most media scares are false or trumped-
up, you will find cases in which public fears have been proved baseless. These are 
examples of individual predispositions, but undoubtedly cultural forces, some deep and 
some less so, help account for differences across nations. 
Availability helps to determine beliefs, to be sure; but beliefs help to determine 
availability as well. Both beliefs and availability are endogenous to one another. When 
social and cultural forces interact with salience, to produce concern about one set of 
problems but not another, predispositions are crucial. It is in this sense that availability 
can be a product of forces that must be explained independently. But let us now turn to 
how availability spreads. 
Cascades 
 
Sometimes availability and salience are produced through social bandwagons or 
cascades, in which apparently representative anecdotes and gripping examples move 
rapidly from one person to another.72 Consider a stylized example. Andrew hears of a 
                                                 
72 Chip Heath et al., Emotional Selection in Memes: The Case of Urban Legends, 81 Journal of Personality 
& Social Psychology 1028 (2001); Chip Heath, Do People Prefer to Pass Along Good or Bad News? 
Valence and Relevance as Predictors of Transmission Propensity, 68 Organizational Behavior & Human 
Decision Processes 79 (1996). 
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dangerous event, which he finds to be revealing or illustrative. (The event might involve 
crime, terrorism, pesticides, environmental hazards, or threats to national security.) 
Andrew tells Barry, who would be inclined to see the event as not terribly informative, 
but who, learning Andrew’s reaction, comes to believe that the event does indeed reveal a 
great deal, and that a serious threat exists. Carol would tend to discount the risk, but once 
she hears the shared opinion of Andrew and Barry, she is frightened as well. Deborah 
will have to have a great deal of private information to reject what has become the shared 
opinion of Andrew, Barry, and Carol.73 Stylized though it is, the example shows that once 
several people start to take an example as probative, many people may come to be 
influenced by their opinion, giving rise to cascade effects. Cultural and even national 
differences can be explained partly in this way. 
Among doctors dealing with risks and precautions, cascades are common. “Most 
doctors are not at the cutting edge of research; their inevitable reliance upon what 
colleagues have done and are doing leads to numerous surgical fads and treatment-caused 
illnesses.”74 Thus an article in the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine explores 
“bandwagon diseases” in which doctors act like “lemmings, episodically and with a blind 
infectious enthusiasm pushing certain diseases and treatments primarily because 
everyone else is doing the same.”75 Some medical practices, including tonsillectomy, 
“seem to have been adopted initially based on weak information,” and extreme 
differences in tonsillectomy frequencies (and other procedures) provide good evidence 
that cascades are at work.76 Cross-cultural differences in medical practices can be 
explained in significant part through this route. 
A distinctive feature of social cascades is that the people who participate in them 
are simultaneously amplifying the very social signal by which they are being influenced. 
By their very participation, those who join the cascade increase its size, making it more 
likely that others will join too. Unfortunately, cascades can lead people in mistaken 
                                                 
73 See David Hirschleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational 
Cascades, in The New Economics of Human Behavior 188, 193-4, Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn Ierulli, 
eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
74 Hirshleifer, supra note, at 204. 
75 John F. Burnham, Medical Practice a la Mode: How Medical Fashions Determine Medical Care, 317 
New England Journal of Medicine 1220, 1201 (1987). 
76 See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and 
Informational Cascades, 12(3) J. Econ. Perspect. 151, 167 (1998). 
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directions, with a few “early movers” spurring social fear that does not match reality. In 
the example I have given, Andrew is having a large influence on the judgments of our 
little group, even though he may not, in fact, have accurate information about the relevant 
event. Barry, Carol, and Deborah might have some information of their own, perhaps 
enough to show that there is little reason for concern. But unless they have a great deal of 
confidence in what they do, they are likely to follow those who preceded them. The irony 
is that if most people are following others, then little information is provided by the fact 
that some or many seem to share a certain fear. Most are responding to the signals 
provided by others, unaware that those others are doing exactly the same thing. Of course 
corrections might well come eventually, but sometimes they are late.  
In the domain of risks and precautions, “availability cascades” are responsible for 
many social beliefs.77 A salient event, affecting people because it is available, tends to be 
repeated, leading to cascade effects, as the event becomes available to increasingly large 
numbers of people. The point is amplified by the fact that fear-inducing accounts, with 
high emotional valence, are especially likely to spread.78 There is a general implication 
here. Because different social influences can be found in different communities, local 
variations are inevitable, with different examples becoming salient in each. Hence such 
variations—between say New York and Ohio, or England and the United States, or 
between Germany and France—might involve coincidence or small or random factors, 
rather than large-scale cultural differences. Different judgments within different social 
groups, with different “available” examples, owe their origin to social processes of this 
sort. Indeed the different reactions to nuclear power in France and the United States can 
be explained in large part in this way. And when some groups concentrate on cases in 
which guns increased violence, and others on cases in which guns decreased violence, 
availability cascades are a large part of the reason. Return to my epigraph: “Many 
Germans believe that drinking water after eating cherries is deadly; they also believe that 
                                                 
77 See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683 
(1999). 
78 See Heath et al., supra note 215. 
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putting ice in soft drinks is unhealthy. The English, however, rather enjoy a cold drink of 
water after some cherries; and Americans love icy refreshments.”79
 
Group Polarization 
 
There is a closely related phenomenon. When like-minded people deliberate with 
one another, they typically end up accepting a more extreme version of the views with 
which they began.80 This is the process known as group polarization. Consider a few 
examples: 
• After discussion, citizens of France become more critical of the United States and 
its intentions with respect to economic aid.81  
• A group of moderately profeminist women becomes more strongly profeminist 
after discussion.82 
• After discussion, whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more negative 
responses to the question whether white racism is responsible for conditions faced 
by African-Americans in American cities.83  
• After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice offer more 
positive responses to the same question, that is, they are more likely to find white 
prejudice to be the source of conditions faced by African-Americans in American 
cities.84 
• Juries inclined to award punitive damages typically produce awards that are 
significantly higher than the awards chosen, before deliberation, by their median 
member.85 
Group polarization will inevitably occur in the context of perceptions of risk; and 
hence group polarization helps to account for cultural and even national differences. If 
                                                 
79 See Joseph Henrich et al., Group Report: What is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?, in 
Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox 353-54, Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten, eds. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), for an entertaining outline in connection with food choice decisions. 
80 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
81 Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition 224 (New York: Free Press, 1985). 
82 See David G. Myers, Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization, 28 Human Relations 699 (1975).  
83 David G. Myers & George D. Bishop, The Enhancement of Dominant Attitudes in Group Discussion, 20 
J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 386 (1971), 
84 See id.  
85 See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 2002). 
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several people fear global warming or terrorism, and speak to one another, their fear is 
likely to increase as a result of internal discussions. If other people believe that nuclear 
power is probably safe, their belief to that effect will be fortified after they speak with 
one another, to the point where they will believe that nuclear power is no reason for 
concern. If some groups seem hysterical about certain risks, and other groups treat those 
risks as nonexistent, group polarization is likely to be a reason. Hence group polarization 
provides another explanation for the different fears of groups, localities, and even 
nations. Internal discussions can make Berliners fearful of risks than do not bother New 
Yorkers, and vice-versa; so too, the citizens of London may fear a supposed danger that 
does not much bother the citizens of Paris—even if the danger is not greater in the former 
than in the latter.  
 Group polarization undoubtedly occurs in connection with the availability 
heuristic. Suppose, for example, that several people are discussing mad cow disease, or a 
recent wave of sniper attacks, or cases involving the kidnapping of young girls, or 
situations in which the government has wrongly ignored a serious foreign threat. If the 
particular examples are mentioned, they are likely to prove memorable. And if the group 
has a predisposition to think that one or another risk is serious, social dynamics will lead 
the group to believe that the example is highly revealing. An initial predisposition toward 
fear is likely to be aggravated after collective deliberations. Within groups, a tendency 
toward fear breeds its own amplification. 
Consider in this light the 2004 report of the United States Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, which contended the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
predisposition to find a serious threat from Iraq led it to fail to explore alternative 
possibilities or to obtain and use the information that it actually held.86 Falling victim to 
group polarization in the particular context of fear. the agency showed a “tendency to 
reject information that contradicted the presumption” that Iraq had weapons of mass 
destruction.87 This claim is a remarkable echo of one that followed the 2003 investigation 
of failures at NASA, in which the Columbia Accident Investigation Board explicitly 
attributed the accident to NASA's unfortunate culture, one that does too little to elicit 
                                                 
86 Available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/.  
87 Id. at 6. 
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information. In the Board's words, NASA lacks "checks and balances"88 and pressures 
people to follow a "party line."89 The result was a process of polarization that led to a 
dismissal of serious risks.  
Media, Interest Groups, and Politicians 
 
It should be clear that in the real world, some voices are more important than 
others, especially when availability and salience are involved. In particular, the behavior 
and preoccupations of the media play a large role. Many perceived “epidemics” are in 
reality no such thing, but instead a product of media coverage of gripping, 
unrepresentative incidents. Attention to those incidents is likely to ensure availability and 
salience, promoting an inaccurately high estimate of probability and at the same time 
some degree of probability neglect. And in the face of close media attention, the demand 
for legal responses will be significantly affected. Changes within and even across nations 
are a natural result. 
Knowing the importance of media coverage, well-organized private groups work 
extremely hard to promote public attention to particular risks. Some of these groups are 
altruistic; others are entirely self-interested. The common tactic is to publicize an incident 
that might trigger both availability and salience. Terrorists themselves are the most 
extreme and vicious example, using high-visibility attacks to convince people that “they 
cannot be safe anywhere.” But many illustrations are less objectionable and sometimes 
even benign. In the United States, consider the abandoned hazardous waste at Love 
Canal, used to promote hazardous waste cleanup, or the Exxon Valdez disaster, used by 
the Sierra Club and other environmental organizations to promote more stringent 
safeguards against oil spills. Showing at least a working knowledge of the availability 
heuristic, private groups seize on selected incidents and publicize them to make them 
generally salient to the public. In all of these examples, the use of particular instances 
might be necessary to move the public, and legislatures, in the right directions. Certainly 
the social processes that interact with salience and availability can promote reform where 
                                                 
88 Report of The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, available at  
http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html, at 12. 
89 Id. at 102. 
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it is needed. But there is no assurance here, particularly if social influences are leading 
people to exaggerate a problem, or to ignore the question of probability altogether. 
Politicians engage in the same basic project. By its very nature, the voice of an 
influential politician comes with amplifiers. When public officials bring an incident 
before the public, a seemingly illustrative example is likely to spread far and wide. A 
legal enactment can itself promote availability; if the law responds to the problems 
associated with hazardous waste dumps, or “hate crimes,” people might well come to see 
those problems as readily available. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 would 
inevitably loom large no matter what President George W. Bush chose to emphasize. But 
the President, and his White House generally, referred to the attacks on countless 
occasions, frequently as a way of emphasizing the reality of seemingly distant threats and 
the need to incur significant costs to counteract them (including the 2003 Iraq war, itself 
fueled by presidential speeches including vivid narratives of catastrophic harm). And 
there is no doubt that the salience of these attacks played a large role in affecting political 
behavior—and that this role cannot be understood without reference to social influences. 
The implications for cultural differences should be clear. If leaders in different nations 
draw attention to different risks, there will be large-scale differences in risk perceptions. 
 
Predispositions and Culture 
 
But all this does not provide the full picture. Beliefs and orientations are a product 
of availability, and social influences ensure both availability and salience. But as I have 
suggested, what is available is also a product of antecedent beliefs and orientations, both 
individual and social. In other words, availability is endogenous to, or a product of, 
predispositions, individual, cultural, and national. A great deal of further work remains to 
be done on this topic.90  
Why do some people recall and emphasize incidents in which a failure to take 
precautions led to serious environmental harm? A likely reason is that they are 
predisposed to favor environmental protection. And why do some people recall and 
emphasize incidents in which environmental protection led to huge costs for little gain? A 
                                                 
90 On culture, an influential treatment is Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (1984); a 
natural reading of work by, and inspired by, Douglas and Wildavsky is that availability is a product of 
cultural orientations, rather than vice versa. But see Vogel, supra note, for a contrasting view. 
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likely reason is that they are predisposed to oppose environmental controls. Here is an 
interaction between the availability heuristic and confirmation bias—“the tendency to 
seek information to confirm our original hypotheses and beliefs,”91 a tendency that 
reviewers have found in the judgments, referred to above, of both the Central Intelligence 
Agency and NASA. Confirmation bias plays a large role in different risk perceptions 
across individuals and groups. If members of a culturally distinct group are predisposed 
to believe that new technologies are risky, or that genetically modified organisms are 
hazardous, or that cell phones produce cancer, apparently supportive illustrations will be 
memorable, and contrary ones will be discounted. 
Of course predispositions are not a black box, and they do not come from the sky. 
They have sources. Among their sources are availability and salience. After incidents of 
mad cow disease in England, many Europeans lost trust in the relevant authorities and 
acquired a predisposition to fear, and to take and urge precautions against, associated and 
analogous threats. In Europe, the growth of precautionary thinking, across certain 
domains, had a great deal to do with particular salient incidents.92 Hence there is complex 
set of interactions, with heuristics helping to constitute predispositions, which are in turn 
responsible for the real-world operation of heuristics. All this happens socially, not 
merely individually; and predispositions are not static. When people are in a group that is 
predisposed in a particular direction, the salient examples will be quite different from 
those that are salient in a group with an opposite predisposition. Here group polarization 
is especially important. What is sometimes described as “culture,” or as “deep-rooted 
cultural differences,” may be no such thing. Cascade effects and polarization, interacting 
with availability, can be responsible for inclinations and variations that might well have 
taken another form. 
On the other hand, different cultural orientations can play a large role in 
determining what turns out to be available. For example, the United States is highly 
diverse, and for some purposes, it is plausible to think of different regions and groups as 
having different cultures. Within African-American communities, the available instances 
are sometimes quite different from those that can be found within all-white communities. 
                                                 
91 See Elliott Aronson, The Social Animal 150 (New York: W.H. Freeman, 7th ed., 1995).  
92 See Vogel, supra note. 
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Across nations, the differences are even more striking, in part because different world-
views play such a dominant role. And what is true for individuals is true for nations as 
well. Just as predispositions are, in part, a function of availability, so too availability is, in 
part, a function of predispositions. Social influences operate at both levels, affecting what 
is available and also moving predispositions in one or another direction. The problem is 
that both individuals and societies may be fearful of nonexistent or trivial risks—and 
simultaneously neglect real dangers.  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have ventured a conceptual claim and a psychological hypothesis. 
The conceptual claim is that it is not possible to be “precautionary” in general. An 
individual or a nation can take precautions against particular risks, to be sure, but no 
individual or nation can be precautionary as a general proposition. The reason is that risks 
are on all sides of social situations. If a person or state purports to be precautionary, it is 
almost certainly taking steps that create risks of their own. The point certainly holds for 
aggressive regulation of genetic modification of food and greenhouse gases; it holds as 
well for preemptive wars. 
The psychological hypothesis is that the operation of the Precautionary Principle, 
and differences in risk perception among nations, have a great deal to do with the 
availability heuristic. If people can think of cases in which a risk has come to fruition, 
they are far more likely to think that the risk should be taken seriously. “Availability 
bias,” in the form of excessive fear, and “unavailability bias,” in the form of unjustified 
neglect, are unfortunate results. All cultures suffer from both of these. But they suffer 
from them in different ways, because what is available in one culture is often less 
available, or unavailable, in others. 
Of course availability is a product of social influences. Cascade effects and group 
polarization play substantial roles in making one or another incident available to many or 
most. There are multiple equilibria here: It is hardly inevitable that SARS would have 
great salience in Canada but not in the United States. Single incidents and small shocks 
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can make an extraordinary difference. Moreover, what is available to some will not be 
available to all, in part because of social influences, and in part because of individual, 
cultural, and national predispositions. Hence I have emphasized that some cultures will 
find some risks “available” not because of simple facts, but because the relevant citizens 
are predisposed to focus on some risks but not on others.  
I believe that the availability heuristic provides many clues about the operation of the 
Precautionary Principle and cross-cultural risk perceptions. But a great deal of 
empirical work remains to be done, not least in exploring the complex interactions 
among individual cognition, cascade effects, the behavior of those who spread 
information, and cultural predispositions.  
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